And when analysts estimate they depend on what I will call mind-set. Email: robert.jervis@sipa.columbia.edu WHY THE CIA DOESN’T DO BETTER.

Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War, Robert Jervis, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010. Robert Jervis is Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics at Columbia University. Robert Jervis begins his study of two well-known cases, the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the 2003 Iraq War, by noting that the question is more complicated than it may first … 238 pp, endnotes and index. This video is unavailable. I. Combatting Mind-set, Jack Davis. With Why Intelligence Fails Robert Jervis provides a detailed and very insightful critique of two intelligence estimates but discerns broader problems as well as possible solutions to make intelligence analysis better from there. Can intelligence failure be avoided? Filed under A specialized intelligence website written by experts, since 2008 Tagged with CIA, CIA Chief Information Officer, CIA Historical Collections Division, declassification, Edward Price, history, intelligence budget, intelligence funding, Mark Zaid, News, Robert Jervis, United States

When intelligence analysts cannot rely solely on factual evidence to address questions of concern to US national security, they have to begin to employ judgment. 1. Watch Queue Queue Contact details: Robert Jervis, International Affairs Building, Room 1333, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of Political Science, 116th Street and Broadway, New York, NY 10027 USA. Watch Queue Queue. The author was contracted by the CIA to conduct a post mortem analysis of CIA estimates of the stability of the Persian government before the revolution of 1978. Introduction.

In effect, when we do not know, we estimate. His most recent book is Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Cornell University Press, 2010). Torrey Froscher.